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There is a growing interest in the research community in the local governance of
migration and integration. Studies indicate a local turn in integration policies, with
local governments becoming important integration policy actors. Unlike most
research, this study of recent developments in the policies for migrant newcomers in
Denmark and Sweden observes a national turn in local integration policy. Despite
their different integration policies, the central governments of both countries have
increased their control and influence at the local level and thereby made it more
difficult for local governments to formulate their own integration policies. This study
highlights the need to complement earlier research based on frame analysis with an
analytical framework that takes central government steering and the uneven power
relationship between the levels of government into account.
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There is a growing interest in the research community in the local aspects of integra-
tion and migration (Alexander, 2007; Caponio and Borkert, 2010). The local dimension
of integration policy is also acknowledged at the European level, where more efforts
are being made to promote knowledge exchanges between cities, for example the CLIP
project and the EuroCities network. Criticism of methodological nationalism (Wimmer
and Glick-Schiller, 2003) seems to have fuelled a desire to go beyond an analysis of in-
tegration policies at the national level. Instead of studying national models of integra-
tion, the focus has been on understanding whether and how national policies are
implemented at the local level and whether municipalities are formulating policies of
their own. Most of these studies indicate a local turn of integration policy and that
local governments have increased their significance as integration policy actors
(Alexander, 2007; Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello and Vertovec, 2004; Penninx, 2009;
Caponio and Borkert, 2010; Schmidtke, 2014). Many of the studies of local integration
policies have a multi-level governance perspective. Their main focus is on the relations be-
tween national and local integration policies, especially the congruencies and incongru-
ences between local and national policies and between local policies in different cities
(Borkert and Bosswick, 2007; Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Bak Jørgensen, 2012;2016 Emilsson. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
Emilsson Comparative Migration Studies  (2015) 3:7 Page 2 of 16Scholten, 2013; Dekker, Emilsson, Krieger and Scholten, 2015). While some studies find that
national models of integration are still highly influential at the local level, and that there is a
congruence between national and local integration policies (Dekker, et al. 2015), most re-
search indicates a growing incongruence between the national and local level (Bak
Jørgensen, 2012; Scholten, 2013). There are two main explanations for these incongruences.
The local pragmatism thesis argues that there is a specific local dimension of integration
policies characterized by a greater tendency to accommodate ethnic diversity and solve inte-
gration problems in pragmatic ways (Caponio and Borkert, 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten,
2008; Bak Jørgensen, 2012). The localist thesis argues that there are no national or local
models of integration, but that local policies are uniquely shaped by the specific problem-,
political- and policy settings in the different cities (Alexander, 2007; Mahnig, 2004). Both
the local pragmatist thesis and the localist thesis suggest a disintegration of national integra-
tion models and point to the importance of studying integration policy beyond national
frameworks.
The fieldwork and research undertaken for the EU-7 framework project, UniteEurope
in Copenhagen and Malmö,1 made me question the growing consensus on the in-
creased importance of the local level in integration policies. I therefore decided to look
for a methodological and theoretical framework that would facilitate an analysis of the
recent developments in Denmark and Sweden. The aim of this article is to add a new
approach to the study of local integration policies by looking at the multi-level govern-
ance of integration policies through a power perspective lens. Power is operationalized
by analysing the autonomy of local governments and their compliance with national
policies. Contrary to most research, I argue that what we are witnessing is a national
turn on local integration policy, where local integration policies and practices are in-
creasingly governed by the state. Using case studies from Denmark and Sweden, I show
that in recent years the governments of the two countries have increased their control
and local influence and thereby limited the possibilities for local governments to for-
mulate their own integration policies.
One important explanation as to why most researchers agree on a local turn of inte-
gration policy and that national models of integration are becoming weaker is that they
look at the relationship between the local and national level using frame analysis (see
for example Bak Jørgensen, 2012; Scholten, 2013). This makes them look at integration
policy from a rhetorical perspective, i.e. how an actor defines the problems, diagnoses
the causes, makes moral judgements and suggests remedies for integration (D’Angelo
and Kuypers, 2010). Official policy documents are studied with a view to unveiling the
central organizing idea or ideology behind the policies. If local governments are found
to adopt official integration policies that are ideologically different from those of the
central government, the conclusion is that national models of integration are disinte-
grating. This divergence of local and national integration policy frames has been identi-
fied by Bak Jørgensen, (2012) in the case of Denmark and by Scholten, (2013) in the
case of the Netherlands. With regard to Germany, Schmidtke, (2014) finds that the
growing divergence is a result of a conscious choice to decentralize public policy re-
sponsibilities from the federal to regional and local governments. These studies have
contributed to the understanding that local governments can also be integration policy-
makers. At the same time, they risk giving the wrong impression of what is happening
at the national and local level when it comes to integration policy.
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of integration. The first is that policy frames/integration ideologies may not mirror actual
integration policies and measures. For example, Dahlström, (2004) has found striking dis-
crepancies in Sweden between integration rhetoric and integration practice. Although the
national integration policy frames have changed several times since the adoption of the first
immigrant policy in 1968 – from universalism to multiculturalism and back again – the
practices and measures have not changed in any major way. A similar phenomenon can be
found at the local level, where local integration policies often lack legitimacy and are
assigned a subordinate role in the administration (Caponio, 2010:179). The second weak-
ness, and the most important for my argument, is that frame analysis often fails to address
the power relationship between national and local governments. As I will show, national
governments use steering instruments that to a large extent determine the municipalities’
discretion when it comes to local integration policies. If the state decides which integration
measures should be implemented at the local level it means that local authorities have little
room for manoeuvre. Although I suggest that there is a national turn in local integration
policies, it does not mean that local dimensions of integration policies do not exist, or that
the scholars using frame analysis are wrong in their conclusions that there is a policy diver-
gence between national and local levels of government. Integration policies that go against
the national models can be formulated at local level, but may be limited in scope.
The aim of the article is to study whether there is a local or national turn in local inte-
gration policies and how this has come about. The cases studied are Denmark and
Sweden: two countries with similar welfare states and local government structures (Sellers
and Lindtsröm, 2007) but with very different national integration policies (Brochmann
and Hagelund, 2012). The stipulation of a national turn is put to the test using these two
cases. Denmark and Sweden are two of the most decentralized countries in the world
(Sellers and Lindtsröm, 2007) and their migration and integration policies have diverged
tremendously over the years of study. If both countries are found to have experienced a
national turn of local integration policy the study will have made a valuable contribution
to research, especially as in many ways they represent least likely cases.
As will be shown, both national governments have increased their control and local influ-
ence and thereby limited the possibilities for local governments to formulate their own inte-
gration policies. The centralization of local integration policies has occurred in both cases,
albeit in a different way and using different strategies. The increased interference of the na-
tional governments in local integration policies takes the form of laws and regulations that
force local municipalities to implement certain integration measures by means of increased
state funding for measures implemented at the local level and increased direct state involve-
ment in the implementation of local integration policies. Last but not least, in Denmark,
state legislation has had an increasing impact on the lives of individual migrants.
Even though this article only investigates the developments in Denmark and Sweden,
there are signs of a broader European trend towards a national turn of local integration
policy. Other countries have also centralized their integration policies. For example,
Germany introduced a national integration policy in 2005 and state agencies are now re-
sponsible for integration programmes at the local level. In the last 15 years, many
European countries have also introduced civic integration policies that have substantially
increased the integration requirements for migrant newcomers (Wallace Goodman,
2010).
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relationship between central and local governments is played out in all the different di-
mensions of integration. In this article, the focus is on local integration policies for mi-
grant newcomers, because this has been one of the most contested integration topics in
recent years in both Denmark and Sweden. Newcomer integration is also a topic on
which states and cities tend to diverge in perspective and approach (Gebhardt, 2014:3).
In the concluding section of the article I sketch a model that demonstrates how the
theoretical framework used in this article can be utilized to examine the multi-level
governance of integration in a more comprehensive way in future research.
Framework for analyzing local integration policy and multi-level governance
As indicated at the beginning of the article, most studies of multi-level governance and
local integration policy use frame analysis and have focused on the narratives and phil-
osophies of integration and how they differ at the local and national level. I argue that
this method only captures one side of the multi-level relationship. In this article I use a
method that captures the power relation between the national and local government
levels, which in turn determines the discretion at local level when it comes to integra-
tion policy. The development of multi-level governance is often described as a result of
three broad developmental trends: up, down and out (Pierre and Peters, 2000), or as
combining a vertical and horizontal dimension of multi-level governance (Hooghe and
Marks, 2003). In this article I am only interested in the relation between the state and
the local level/municipalities. In the literature it has been noted that responsibility for
certain policy areas has shifted downwards to the regional and local political levels
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001) and that governments have replaced traditional forms of
governing with governance. The question is whether this is true for integration policies.
I analyze the multi-level governance of integration using a theoretical model inspired by
Etzioni, (1975), which was originally developed to make a comparative analysis of complex
organizations. The model’s main advantage is that it captures the power relations between
those higher and lower in rank (ibid. p.5). The central concept in Etzioni’s book is compli-
ance, which he sees as a key element in all organizations. Compliance relations are asym-
metric and vertical. It is about how subordinated actors behave in relation to another
actor’s power, and how those in power make other actors follow their directives. As
Etzioni points out, a compliance relationship does not assume that the subordinates have
no power, only that they have less (Etzioni, 1975, p.4). Etzioni mainly uses his model to
understand power relations between people within an organization, although his model
has also been used to study how the state governs its authorities and local governments
(Vedung, 1991). The relationship we are interested in here is that between the state and
local governments. They are part of a common organization, and while local governments
have more or less power depending on their national settings, they are always subordinate
to central government.
The superior actor, in this case national governments, uses power to ensure the com-
pliance of other actors to carry out the directives and norms it supports. Etzioni de-
scribes three instruments of power: coercive, remunerative and normative (ibid, p.5). In
the case of states and local governments, it is probably better to use the terms coercive,
economic and normative. The instruments can also be seen as sticks, carrots and per-
suasion. The strength of Etzioni’s model is that it captures the multiple ways in which a
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itional understanding of decentralization and centralization of fiscal resources and for-
mal responsibilities. Thus, it captures a steering that is associated with both governance
and government (Kjær, 2004). An alternative theoretical model that could have been
used to analyze the central and local government relations is that created by Goldsmith,
(2002), although his central concept is control and does not take all of the economic
and normative instruments of central government into account.
The methodology of the article is straightforward. In order to study the developments
between the local and central governments I mapped all the major policy decisions re-
lating to migrant newcomers according to the three instruments of power (see sections
The Swedish case and The Danish case). In the main, secondary literature was used to
identify the relevant government documents and legislation that would facilitate an in-
depth study of the decisions taken.
Coercive instruments can be the laws and regulations imposed by the state through
decisions in parliament or, in some cases, decided by central governmental agencies.
The municipalities are obliged to act in accordance with these. The relationship be-
tween central and local government is in this case authoritative. Reallocations of au-
thority between territorial levels can also be made if the state changes the providers of
public services at the different levels of government (Porter and Olsen, 1976). Eco-
nomic instruments often take the form of state funding or the withdrawal of state fund-
ing for targeted measures at the local level implemented by local governments or non-
governmental organizations. Normative instruments involve attempts or the discon-
tinuation of attempts to influence local governments by conviction, persuasion or
knowledge. Direct verbal counselling, education and outreach activities are included
here. These instruments are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined to enforce
compliance at the local level. For example, if the state wants to introduce language tu-
ition for migrants at the local level it can use coercive means through laws and regula-
tions, economic means by providing funding or try normative means to convince
municipalities that this is the right thing to do. Alternatively, the state may decide to
change its strategy on language tuition, withdraw funding and pass decisions about pol-
icy choices to the local level.
In the next part of the article I look at the recent development of integration
policies in Sweden and Denmark using the theoretical multi-level governance
model described above.Two faces of centralization of integration policies
This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the Danish and Swedish government
system in order to understand the formal relationships between the local and national
level. This is followed by two sections on the development of local integration policies
for migrant newcomers in Denmark and Sweden.Governmental structure in Sweden and Denmark
Local governments in Sweden and Denmark balance between self-government and central
control and between the autonomous and integrational model of local government
(Kjellberg, 1995). According to the autonomous model, local governments are a separate
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efficient provision of local services. In the integrational model, local governments are one
part of the public sector and their main role is to implement national policies. These ten-
sions are evident in the Swedish and Danish integration policies, where the ambitions of the
unitary state governments meet powerful local governments (Sellers and Lindtsröm, 2007).
Swedish municipalities are regulated by the Local Government Act of 1991. The Act
specifies the responsibilities of the municipalities and provides outlines for local govern-
ment. According to the law, municipalities are responsible for childcare and for preschool,
primary and secondary schools, the social services, care for the elderly, support for people
with disabilities, health and environmental issues, emergency services (not policing, which
is the responsibility of the central government), urban planning and sanitation (waste,
sewage). Labour market policy is a state responsibility, although at the beginning of the
1990s local authorities became increasingly important actors in labour market policy mea-
sures at the local level.
In Sweden the public sector is made up of three levels: national, regional and local.
The system consists of a centralized national government and municipalities that are to
some degree autonomous and have far-reaching powers of their own. The central gov-
ernment exercises power at all three levels, which leads to a relatively complex struc-
ture at the local level. There are also regional municipalities, which are mainly
responsible for health care and transportation in the region. The municipalities there-
fore share both power and responsibility with national and regional institutions at the
local level.
The principles for local self-government are stated in the constitution. Local and re-
gional municipalities have the right to levy taxes and determine tax rates. The central
government has the overall responsibility for determining how resources are to be dis-
tributed within the country and directs local activities by providing economic guide-
lines and establishing framework legislation. One of the goals of central government is
to guarantee a minimum standard in relation to the various types of service provided
by the municipalities (Gustafsson and Svensson, 1999). Although the national govern-
ment sometimes decides what municipalities should and must do, they nevertheless
have something of a free rein. As we shall see, framework legislation and attempts to
guarantee equal access to services for migrants have been important aspects of the de-
velopment of integration policy in Sweden.
In Sweden there have been trends towards centralization and decentralization in the
last decades. In some cases, the state has decentralized responsibilities from regional
state administrations to regional governments. At the same time, the central govern-
ment has passed several laws that restrict the power of local governments. According
to Feltenius, (2007), this development is explained by a renewed importance of the
principle of equality in welfare provisions.
In Denmark there has been a clearer trend towards decentralization. The major mu-
nicipal reform of 2007 transferred power to the municipalities. Responsibility for pri-
mary education, the social services, care for the elderly, physical planning and child
care was retained and in some cases expanded. Municipalities were also given increased
responsibility for education, the social services, rehabilitation (outside hospitals) and
health promotion. The reform was completed in 2009 when labour market services
were decentralized to the municipalities (Blom-Hansen, 2012). Today the municipalities
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also meant a potential increased autonomy in the field of integration policy.
The municipalities and the regions are allowed to take responsibility for areas as long as
they do not clash with the responsibilities of the national government or another munici-
pality/region. Most local government functions are carried out with full discretion, apart
from some social security benefits (old age pensions in particular) where central govern-
ment covers part of the costs. The recent reform has strengthened the level of municipal
autonomy and made the country even more decentralized than before. Municipalities are
entrusted with more fiscal, political and administrative autonomy than in any other coun-
try (Ivanyna and Shah, 2012). At the same time as the municipalities’ powers were en-
hanced the regions became less important, with fewer responsibilities and no power to
tax their citizens. There is no system of subordination between the regions and the muni-
cipalities because they have different tasks and responsibilities. Therefore, the public sec-
tor in Denmark only has two levels of governing institutions.The Swedish case
Sweden has had a comprehensive immigrant policy in place since 1975 (Bill 1975:26),
when a multiculturalist policy was agreed by parliament. Even though many changes in
content and terminology have been made since then, the basic framework still applies,
which is that migrants should have the same living standards as the native population. Mi-
grants with residence permits therefore have the same rights as Swedish citizens and are
covered by the welfare state. Several policies have been introduced: mother-tongue in-
struction in schools for migrant children, voting rights for foreign citizens in local elec-
tions and subsidies for immigrant associations. After 1985 there was a move away from
multicultural policy for cultural and economic reasons (Schierup and Ålund, 2011;
Geddes, 2003; Södergran, 2000) and ‘immigrant and minority policy’ was renamed ‘immi-
grant policy’ as a result. Following the reorientation in the 1980s the state remained the
guarantor of immigrants’ social and political rights but not of their minority cultural
rights. As the number of humanitarian migrants gradually increased, responsibility for in-
tegration was transferred from the Employment Service to the municipalities (Prop. 1983/
84:125). This shift of responsibility was part of a larger reform aimed at decentralizing in-
tegration policies to the municipalities. At the same time, the most important part of
Swedish integration policy, namely the introduction programme for humanitarian mi-
grants, was introduced. This is the topic in focus for the remainder of the analysis.
Since decentralization in 1985, the central government has gradually increased its ef-
forts to influence local integration policies for migrant newcomers (see Table 1 for a
summary). One reason for the decentralization of the introduction programmes was
that the state wanted to introduce individually designed introduction programmes that
also took the different local conditions into consideration (Sarstrand Marekovic, 2012).
Municipalities were supposed to offer services such as language training, civic orienta-
tion and labour market activities and the state would provide the funding. In many mu-
nicipalities the migrants’ social needs were prioritized (Soininen, 1992). The local
introduction programmes were often planned and implemented by social workers in
line with the Social Services Act. After some time the state reacted to the “care” focus
of the programmes and insisted on a stronger focus on labour market integration.
Table 1 Policies for newly arrived migrants—Sweden
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refugee reception (Bill 1989/90:105 and Ordinance 1990:927). The purpose of the
changes was to increase the incentives for municipalities to speed up the labour market
integration. Previously, the state had compensated the municipalities’ costs for social
assistance. Now, municipalities were given a lump sum compensation for each person.
This meant that local governments could keep the state money if the newcomers be-
came self-sufficient at a faster rate than the 2 years covered by state funding. At this
time the only coercive regulatory framework for the receipt of state funding was that
an introduction plan had to be drawn up for each individual. One year later, in 1992,
another economic incentive was introduced (Bill 1992:1068) which allowed municipal-
ities to give non-means tested economic support to participants in an introduction
programme and thereby increase their economic incentives to find employment.
The 1997 integration policy (Bill 1997/98:16) emphasized individual rights and main-
streaming, but did little to change existing integration measures. The regulatory frame-
work for the local introduction programmes was also retained. In order to encourage
municipalities to adopt more efficient introduction programmes with a stronger focus
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new state agency, the Swedish Integration Board, was set up. One of its main tasks was
to stimulate and help municipalities to develop better and more efficient introduction
programmes. The idea at that time was to design an individual introduction with a
focus on work that, as far as possible, mimicked working life with activities amounting
to a standard working week of 40 hours. The initial strategy of the agency was to pro-
vide local governments with knowledge, highlight good examples and write follow-up
reports. When this strategy was seen as insufficient to influence policy change, the
Swedish Integration Board initiated a strategy for the collaboration and coordination of
integration programmes. It tried to increase policy coordination by means of different
types of agreements between involved stakeholders at the national, regional and local
level. This strategy was successful and produced local and regional agreements on
work-first policy. However, according to Qvist, (2012), this did not really lead to corre-
sponding changes in the organization and structure of the local programmes.
Despite these efforts the central government was not happy about the efficiency of
the programmes. The Social Democrat Government therefore appointed a Commission
of Inquiry to suggest improvements. The proposals (SOU 2003:75) presented in 2003
would have meant a certain centralization of the introduction programmes, but the
government failed to reach agreement with its coalition partners and the reform was
abandoned. After the 2006 elections, and with a new centre-right government in place,
the Swedish Integration Board was laid down. As the economic and normative steering
instruments that had been tried had not yielded results, the government now intro-
duced coercive methods. With the 2010 reform (Bill 2009/10:60) the state took over re-
sponsibility for the introduction programmes from the municipalities. According to the
government, the old programmes had too little focus on labour market activities and
resulted in slow labour market integration. Giving the Employment Service overall re-
sponsibility supposed to strengthen the work-first principle. The government also be-
lieved that the differences between how municipalities organized the programmes were
too great and felt that centralization would guarantee a better implementation of state
policy. The government also launched an introduction benefit for participants in the
programme; an individual state allowance that replaced the old municipal social bene-
fits. Despite the reform the need for local coordination remained great. Today, munici-
palities are still responsible for Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) and civic orientation
courses, for which they receive state funding. A new private actor, an introduction
guide, was also introduced to help migrants find employment, which further added to
the need for coordination. The reform meant increased state involvement in three
ways: the responsibility and administration for the introduction programmes moved
from the municipalities to the state, state funding for the programme increased and the
content of the programme became regulated by law.
The introduction reform has contributed to the greater centralization of integration pol-
icy for migrant newcomers in Sweden, although is not the only example of this. The state,
which in Sweden is responsible for labour market policy, has introduced subsidized em-
ployment directed at migrant newcomers. The state budget for the local introduction pro-
grammes has sky-rocketed from about five billion SEK a year in 2006–2011 to 13 billion
in 2014, and is expected to reach 25 billion in 2017. This is due to a rising number of hu-
manitarian migrants in combination with increased spending per person. In addition, the
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13:188). Family members of humanitarian migrants arriving in Sweden within a 6 years
period, instead of 2 years, are now eligible for an introduction programme. Other state
centralization efforts affecting the local level are a new law that forces municipalities to
accept the settlement of unaccompanied minors, increased rights for undocumented mi-
grants and state funding for local anti-discrimination measures.
The Danish case
Danish immigrant policy was progressively developed in the 1970s by reforms in differ-
ent policy areas. The main principle was equal rights in the welfare state with a few tar-
geted measures, such as language training for migrant newcomers and mother-tongue
instruction in schools (Vad Jönsson and Petersen, 2012). When refugees began to arrive
in larger numbers in the 1980s the government gave the NGO Danish Refugee Council
responsibility for humanitarian migrant newcomers. Introduction activities were mainly
carried out by the Danish Refugee Council, which was authorized to grant social bene-
fits to participants. In 1986 Denmark introduced an 18-month long integration
programme for humanitarian migrants. This programme included language training
and civic orientation, but no labour market activities to speak of. After this period re-
sponsibility was handed over to the municipalities.
Just as in Sweden, in the last decade the Danish central government has decided on
policies and legislation that have increased its influence on integration measures at the
local level. This has not only had profound consequences for municipalities, but also
for individual migrants (see Table 2 for a summary). The process started in 1994 when
the Integration Action Plan made the municipalities responsible for language training
for all migrant newcomers.
The 1998 Integration Act (Act no. 474 of 1 July 1998) made the municipalities re-
sponsible for carrying out the integration policy objectives (Jensen, Schmidt, Tørslev,
Vitus and Weibell, 2010), primarily the introduction programme that was now ex-
panded to include all non-EEA migrants. The aim was to improve the management
and coordination of the integration programmes by assembling all the separate ele-
ments under the same political authority. The Act also stated labour market integration
as an explicit goal for the first time. Municipalities are thus obliged to offer 3-year
introduction programmes in which language training is the key pillar. Also, since 1999
it is up to the state to decide where humanitarian migrants should settle by assigning
local and regional quotas (Nielsen and Jensen 2006). In other words, the municipalities
are responsible for the introduction programmes and their tasks are clearly stated in
the Act. Vad Jönsson and Petersen (2012) describe the policy change as a public cen-
tralistic welfare state solution. Djuve and Kavli, (2007) categorize the introduction re-
gime as a detailed law regulation. The cost of benefits and services are reimbursed by
the state. The reimbursement system is quite complicated and different procedures
have been used to encourage municipalities to implement efficient programmes. Since
2007 economic compensation to municipalities has consisted of three parts, one of
which depends on the results of language training and labour market entry.
When several steps were taken to restrict the migration of non-EU citizens to the coun-
try the number of humanitarian and family migrants fell, while the number of other mi-
grant categories rose. As a response to this, the Danish Government decided in 2010 to
Table 2 Policies for newly arrived migrants—Denmark
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the municipalities this means that they now are obliged by law to offer a larger number of
migrants an introduction course.
Due to the fact that coercive instruments were introduced at an earlier stage in
Denmark to ensure compliance at the local level, normative instruments have not been
used as extensively as in Sweden. The main normative instrument has been the bench-
marking system for measuring municipalities’ success in the labour market integration
of migrant newcomers set up in 2002 (Liebig, 2007) to compare the diffusion of effect-
ive integration measures between municipalities.
Compared to Sweden, the Danish state authorities are not involved in the implementation
of the introduction programmes. However, municipalities must offer integration services to
a broader target group, for which they receive state funding. We can thereby conclude that
over time the state has increased its use of coercive and economic instruments to ensure
compliance with national policies, which in turn has reduced the possibilities for municipal-
ities to independently decide on integration policies for migrant newcomers.
The other aspect of the centralization of Danish integration policy is how the national
integration policies affects individual migrant newcomers. This perspective of the debate
on the local turn has been neglected. Most European countries have introduced some
kind of forced integration in their migration and integration legislation, where migrants
have to show a willingness and capacity to integrate in order to stay in the country and
have equal rights (Wallace Goodman, 2010). This type of legislation prevents municipal-
ities from developing an independent local integration policy. In the Danish case, all the
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comers on the best way forward.
Besides the 1998 Integration Act (Act no. 474 of 1 July 1998) meaning less discretion
for municipalities, it also signalled the start of one of the most restrictive and control-
ling integration regimes in Europe (see for example Mouritsen, Lex, Lindekilde and
Olsen, 2009 and Ersbøll and Gravesen, 2010). The Act introduced various integration
requirements for obtaining a permanent residence permit. Now humanitarian migrants
had to show ‘a will to integrate’ by participation in a 3-year integration programme. At
the same time, the government introduced significantly lower welfare payments to hu-
manitarian migrants (the so-called ‘introduction benefit). Its official rationale was to in-
crease the incentive to provide for oneself, although the lower benefit was also
designed to prevent individuals from seeking asylum in Denmark in the first instance
(Mouritsen, et al. 2009). When a centre-right government took office with support
from the Danish People’s Party in autumn 2001, the path towards the restriction of im-
migration and the introduction of integration requirements was vigorously pursued.
The requirements for obtaining a permanent residence permit and citizenship became
tighter. Danish language tests and employment requirements were also introduced in
order to qualify for permanent residence, family reunification and naturalization. The
right to family reunification was also removed for everyone below the age 25.
More legislation on integration requirements followed in 2006 and 2007 with the intro-
duction of an integration contract and integration examination. These changes meant that
the stakes for obtaining a permanent residence permit were raised. The required language
level for permanent residence was increased to D2E, comparable to the European level
B1. The applicant is also required to have been in ordinary full-time employment for at
least 2 years and 6 months over the past 7 years. The latest major integration related pol-
icy changes were made in 2010. A pre-immigration test for foreigners applying for family
reunification was introduced with a view to strengthening the individual foreigner’s possi-
bilities for a successful and rapid integration into Danish society. Applicants have to take
the test in Denmark and are denied residence if they fail.
The integration legislation is based on the idea that ‘permanent residence is reserved for
foreigners who integrate’, that ‘results count’ and that ‘citizenship must be earned’ (Ersbøll
and Gravesen, 2010). For the individual migrant, the integration process means a one-way
compliance with the standards set by the state. Migrants therefore have to jump through
several legal hoops and prove that they are economically independent and culturally inte-
grated in order to become a Danish citizen (Howard 2009, Bak Jørgensen, 2012).
To sum up, at the local level municipalities and individual migrants are increasingly
governed by the central government. In 1999 the central government passed detailed
legislation indicating the kind of introduction services a municipality had to offer non-
EEA migrant newcomers. In 2010 the provisions were extended to all migrants. Also,
municipalities have no say where humanitarian migrants are settled. For individual mi-
grants, the coercive measures of the state are even more profound.
Concluding discussion
This article uses Denmark’s and Sweden’s policies for migrant newcomers as case stud-
ies to examine whether or not there has been a local or national turn in local integra-
tion policy. The analysis shows that today central governments have more influence
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The developments can be seen as centralization, but could also be seen as a transition
from steering through softer instruments (governance) to more traditional command
and control instruments (government).
Since the early 1990s, the Danish and Swedish national governments have made con-
siderable efforts to influence local integration policies for migrant newcomers in what
is for them regarded as a desired direction. This has been a struggle, since both coun-
tries have some of the most decentralized government structures in the industrialized
world. Normative, economic and coercive instruments have been used to make local
governments comply with the ambitions of the national governments. In Denmark, the
world’s first integration law was passed in 1999 that provided municipalities with de-
tailed instructions as to kind of introduction programmes they had to implement. Even
though the government structure in Denmark was decentralized further in the begin-
ning of the 2000s, local governments have very little autonomy in the integration pol-
icies of migrant newcomers. Their task is to implement what is laid down in the
national laws. This also includes a large part of the administration compelling individ-
ual migrants to comply with the national integration requirements.
In Sweden the central government has been more hesitant about using coercive in-
struments to make local governments comply with national ambitions. Until 2010 the
municipalities were able to decide for themselves what kind of introduction pro-
grammes they wanted to develop. The national government tried to steer the pro-
grammes towards a more work-line principle by using normative and economic
instruments. After disappointing results, the national government decided to take over
responsibility by putting the Employment Service in charge of the introduction pro-
grammes. In this respect the national government not only stripped the municipality of
a large part of its autonomy, but also took control of the implementation procedure.
When Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, proclaims that it will become the most
inclusive city in Europe by 2015, that integration is a two-way process and that diversity
is strength (Copenhagen, 2011), it is easy to think that the Danish national model for
integration is losing its influence and power. After all, the ambitions of Copenhagen
are very different from the assimilation policy of the central government. But local inte-
gration policies matter little when central governments use coercive instruments to en-
sure compliance with national integration policies. A city like Copenhagen may want to
break out of the policy frame set by the central government, but when it comes to pol-
icies for migrant newcomers, all they can do is decide more about less. The city still
has to implement a never ending list of integration measures and administer the inte-
gration requirements directed at migrants that are laid down in the Integration Act and
other state legislation.
The Copenhagen example shows that it is important to complement the research on
local integration policy using frame analysis with research that also looks at the power re-
lations between central and local governments and central governments’ use of different
instruments of compliance. This article has examined one area of integration policy,
namely that directed at migrant newcomers. While most studies of multi-level governance
and integration policy have found that local governments are increasing in importance, I
have shown that when it comes to migrant newcomers, local integration policy is increas-
ingly governed by national governments. In both the Danish and Swedish cases there has
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Sweden, the national government ended up using coercive instruments and took over re-
sponsibility for the entire policy area. Municipalities are now subordinate to the state in
the development of local introduction programmes. Denmark uses the Integration Act as
a coercive instrument to make sure that local governments and migrant newcomers com-
ply with the wishes of the Danish national government.
The findings suggest that national models of integration are still strong and have grown
stronger in recent times. Whether this is true in other countries is an open question, as is
whether other dimensions and areas of integration have developed in a similar way. In
order to improve the knowledge on this topic I suggest a typology for future research that
combines Alexander’s, (2007) typology of local migration policies with the Etzioni, (1975)
framework to analyze the power relations and compliance described in this article. In this
way, the multi-level dynamics of local integration policy could be explored more fully.
In Table 3, three different instruments for compliance are listed on the vertical axis, as
described in the theoretical framework. The horizontal axis includes the four dimensions of
integration policy (Biezeveld and Entzinger, 2003; Alexander, 2007): socio-economic, socio-
cultural, legal-political and spatial (see also Freeman, 2004; Samers, 2010). The socio-eco-
nomic dimension captures a broad category of policy areas, such as the labour market, edu-
cation, housing, healthcare, social security and policing. The socio-cultural dimension
captures the more subjective and interactive dimension of migrant integration. This dimen-
sion involves policies referring to processes of migrant acculturation. The legal-political di-
mension primarily captures the civic and political incorporation of migrants into society.
The legal part of this refers to access to citizenship, anti-discrimination legislation and legal
provisions that are specific to migrant groups. The spatial dimension basically separates out
the indicators related to ‘housing’ from the socio-economic dimension and puts them to-
gether in a separate dimension. The spatial dimension refers to the housing position of mi-
grants, as well as the spatial concentration or dispersion of migrants and symbolic spatial
uses.
The different boxes in the table show examples of possible state involvement in local
integration policy categorized by the instruments of compliance and the dimensions of
integration. This article is situated in the socio-economic dimension and analyzes the
multi-level relations between the state and municipalities over time in Denmark and
Sweden. For a fuller picture of the multi-level dynamics of integration policy, other in-
tegration dimensions should also be studied to determine whether we really are experi-
encing a national or local turn of local integration policy.Table 3 Typology of state—municipal relations in local integration policy, by compliance
instruments and dimensions of integration
Socio-economic Legal-political Socio-cultural Spatial
Coercive
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